The thinking behind the introduction of digital ID is to improve the function of public services and the ability of people to access the things they need from the state. I’m sure I’m not alone in being persistently frustrated by the clunky and bureaucratic nature of accessing a GP appointment or having to produce old energy bills to prove my identity and believe a digital ID would solve a lot of these everyday frustrations, saving both the government and members of the public time and money.
I therefore believe that digital ID would put more power and control in the hands of people – from booking appointments or applying for benefits online, to proving your age, or opening bank accounts. However, initially the government has proposed that digital ID be used for right to work checks only, meaning by the end of this parliament employers will be required to conduct digital right to work checks using the new digital ID. In the UK you already need proof of ID to work legally, and so the focus of this policy is to streamline and digitise the form of ID that will be required.
Unfortunately, we do know that sometimes people fake identification documents, or share national insurance numbers, in order to work in the UK. There is no silver bullet to solving illegal working, but it is clear that criminals are claiming the UK labour market is easy to cheat when compared to European countries where digital IDs are commonplace, as they seek to profit from offering dangerous and illegal journeys to the UK.
The government has considered evidence from Estonia, where there is a high level of control retained by individual citizens over what parts of the digital ID can be seen by which services. Estonia’s system reportedly saves each citizen hours every month by streamlining unnecessary bureaucracy, and the move to becoming a digital society has saved 1-2% of GDP for the country, reducing the burden on taxpayers.
In terms of concerns about data security and centralised data storage, I agree that ensuring the government follows the highest data security standards is essential. The government has said privacy will be put first at every step, using encryption, authentication, and decentralising data storage. There is even evidence that digital ID credentials could reduce identity theft risks by limiting unnecessary exposure of personal details. Unlike physical IDs, if a digital ID is lost or stolen it can be quickly revoked, updated, and reissued.
It is vital that digital ID is inclusive, that is why the government is launching a public consultation to work closely with employers, trade unions, civil society groups and other stakeholders to co-design the programme. Only after that process has concluded will new legislation be brought forward, and I will be sure to scrutinise the legislation carefully with colleagues and debate it in the House of Commons to ensure I am happy that the concerns people have raised have been adequately addressed.
Finally, what I would say is that despite what opponents of digital identity might imply, the vast majority of citizens already use digital identity extensively in their daily lives – modern passports contain a digital identity chip, most people register for government services using online digital accounts, and private digital identities are everywhere – from Facebook to supermarket loyalty cards to video game profiles and email accounts. Therefore, I do not accept the argument that the introduction of an efficient, uniform national scheme would be the fundamental change some are claiming. Such schemes are already commonplace across Europe.